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The exploitation of hydro resources for generating electricity at cheaper cost gives rise to 
significant economic rent to owners. Cameroon, which has a great hydropower potential is 
engaged in developing the resources. Thus, the main goal of this study is to calculate the 
potential economic rent that could be generated in the Cameroonian hydropower sector in 
order to meet the electricity needs and to achieve the “Cameroon 2035 Vision” promoted by 
the Government. In this study the hydropower rent is calculated for the whole country as the 
difference between optimized total costs of two hypothetical systems: one with hydropower 
and the other without hydropower. We also analyse the sensitivity of the rent estimation due 
to variations in some key parameters. Using the LEAP software system, our calculation gives 
a value of 16.937 Euro/MWh of hydropower rent for the Median scenario concerning the 
future demand trends. This rent is in the range of values found by Amundsen and Tjøtta 
(1993), Banfi et al. (2005) and Shrestha and Abeygunawardana (2009) for Norway, 
Switzerland and Nepal respectively. 
 







Hydropower is the electric power obtained by converting the hydraulic energy of the different 
flows of water (rivers, ocean currents and waterfalls). From an economic viewpoint, a 
hydropower plant differs from a conventional thermal plant; because its initial investment cost 
per kW is much higher but the operating costs are extremely low, since there is no need to pay 
for fuel or in some countries for water rights. Thus, the exploitation of hydro resources for 
generating electricity is economically attractive and gives rise to significant economic rent to 
owners.  
In the past, governments have usually claimed ownership of hydroelectric resources and 
passed on the rents to their state-owned utilities, which have used them to expand their 
systems or provide lower tariffs to their consumers. With the restructuring of the electric 
power sector in many countries, a more explicit consideration of hydroelectric rents is 
required. Moreover, hydropower resources are often owned by more than one party, or at least 
require cooperation between parties to develop them. In this context, the measurement and 
apportionment of hydropower rents between cooperating parties becomes important 
(Rothman, 2000). 
Cameroon, which has a great potential of hydropower is engaged in the development of such 
resources. Thus, the aim of this study is to calculate the potential economic rent that could be 
generated in order to meet the electricity needs and to achieve the “Cameroon 2035 Vision” 
promoted by the Government. However, public authorities are facing difficulties to attract 
private investment. Indeed, in addition to legal, political and macroeconomic risks also 
encountered in other infrastructure industries, the Cameroonian electricity sector is 
characterized by regulated tariffs too low for operators, but too high for poor people in rural 
and suburban areas. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the concept of rent in the 
hydroelectric power and present different methods for calculating the rent as they have been 
used in other studies. Section 3 describes the power sector in Cameroon and the Government 
strategy to cope with the growth of electricity demand. Section 4 contains information on the 
data set and the methods used to estimate the rent of hydropower plants in Cameroon. Section 
5 outlines the main results and the effects of variations in some key parameters on the rent. 






2. Rent in the hydroelectric power 
2.1 – Definitions 
The concept of rent has evolved considerably since David Ricardo’s classic examination in 
his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, first published in 1817. Building on the 
work of the late seventeenth-century mercantilists, the physiocrats, Adam Smith, David Hume 
and others, Ricardo espoused a notion of land rent that has been expanded and refined into the 
modem concept of economic rent (Rothman, 2000). Economic rent is the surplus return 
(earnings or profit) that some factors of production generate when they vary in quality and are 
limited in supply. Surplus means that the return is more than what the factor could earn in its 
next best occupation. In other words, the return is greater than needed to keep the factor in 
that use or a reward in excess of that required to bring forth a desired effort or function. If all 
factors of production were of the same quality, none could earn a surplus return since factors 
could be interchanged. Furthermore, if the factors were available in limitless quantities, they 
would earn no return at all. Thus, economic rent arises from two main sources: differences in 
quality of factors of production (differential rent) and scarcity (scarcity rent). 
 Differential rent is often called Ricardian rent since that is the type of rent discussed in 
David Ricardo’s classic treatment of the subject. It arises when the fulfillment of demand 
requires simultaneously bringing into service resources of different qualities. In the case 
of land, sources of differential rent include soil fertility and proximity to markets. 
Resource extraction activities, such as mining and oil and gas production, can generate 
differential rent from differences in the grade of ore, petroleum or gas, proximity to the 
surface (ease of extraction), the need for environmental mitigation measures, etc. 
 Scarcity rent – called absolute rent by Karl Marx – is rent that a landowner could earn on 
land that generated no differential rent. It refers to the price paid for the use of the 
homogeneous land when its supply is limited in relation to demand. If all land is 
homogeneous but demand for land exceeds its supply, the entire land will earn economic 
rent by virtue of its scarcity. In this way, rent will arise when supply of land is inelastic. 
Thus, scarcity rent occurs when limits on the supply of a resource allow producers to 
charge prices greater than their marginal costs. 
 
Differential and scarcity rent at hydroelectric sites 
Hydroelectric generation relies on the exploitation of nature's resources and, therefore, can be 
expected to give rise to economic rent. Rent at hydroelectric sites can result from the limited 
number of sites that are suitable for hydroelectric development, as well as the ability of some 
hydroelectric sites to generate electricity at lower cost than other alternative generation 
technologies. This implies that hydro rent can include both differential rent and scarcity rent 
(Rothman, 2000) or (Hartwick and Olewiler, 1998). 
Differential rent arises since hydro is often a low-cost option for power generation. Just as the 
highest-cost mine regulates the differential rent that can be earned at lower-cost mines, the 
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marginal production cost of alternative sources of electricity limits the differential rent that 
can be earned on hydro sites. 
Scarcity rent also accrues from hydro sites, although the rationale is perhaps less intuitive than 
the rationale for differential rent. Hydro sites produce an output (electricity) for which there 
are abundant opportunities to produce using non-hydro production methods (gas, oil, coal, 
nuclear, geothermal, wind turbine and solar among them). Scarcity rent will arise if the 
marginal generation source can produce only limited quantities of electricity (i.e., is subject to 
scarcity limitations itself). Scarcity rent also arises from the seasonal limitations on the 
amount of water contained in a dam. Within any given season, one would expect the limited 
water to be managed and consumed according to its "water value" inclusive of a scarcity rent 
(Amundsen et al., 1992). 
 
Figure 1: Economic rent at hydroelectric developments 


















Figure 1 illustrates rents arising from alternative electricity generation technologies. Total 
economic rent from any given source of electricity generation is the difference between the 
marginal cost of production (denoted Cj) and the price for electricity that would obtain in a 
fully competitive market for electricity (P). Competitive markets would establish electricity 
prices at the marginal production cost of the marginal source used in an efficient electricity 
generation system. Assuming there are five sources of electricity (Qj), economic rent (Rj) 
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of production, since demand and therefore value of the electricity fluctuates according to the 
load duration curve. Each hydro site could be classified as a different source of electricity and 
generate its own level of rent depending on the site-specific marginal production cost. 
 
2.2 – Review of literature  
The applied economic literature on the resource rent of hydropower is surprisingly small. The 
few published studies concern Canada ([Bernard et al., 1982], Zuker and Jenkins [1984], 
Gillen and Wen [2000]), Norway (Amundsen and Tjøtta, 1993), Switzerland (Banfi et al., 
2005), Nepal (Shrestha and Abeygunawardana, 2009), Lao PDR (Boungnong and Phonekeo, 
2012) and Italy (Massarutto and Pontoni, 2015). 
As with other forms of rent, measuring hydro rent is, conceptually, simple. As shown in 
Figure 1, hydropower rent is the competitively determined electricity price minus the 
marginal cost of producing the hydroelectric power. Unfortunately, neither of these values is 
readily observable in jurisdictions with public utilities and regulated tariffs. Regulated 
electricity tariffs, typically set at the utility's average cost, remain the norm in most countries 
(Rothman, 2000). Therefore alternative approaches have been used to calculate the 
hydropower rent. 
Bernard et al. (1982) was the first study to estimate hydro rent in Canada. Their purpose was 
to develop a hypothetical tax base analogous to the tax bases calculated for other natural 
resources. Therefore, their approach involved estimating "the cost savings or rent arising from 
the use of a site or deposit compared to the costs of inferior ways of satisfying demand." More 
specifically, rents were measured as the value of the electricity derived from the hydro site 
(measured as alternative-method cost) minus all long-run and short-run costs to produce the 
electricity discounted to a present value. 
Zuker and Jenkins (1984) rejected the method used by Bernard et al. (1982) for calculating 
the hydropower rent as the incremental cost of building new thermal plants to replace 
hydropower generation (while considering the rest of the system unchanged) includes some 
costs associated with current system inefficiencies. Instead, Zuker and Jenkins (1984) 
calculated the rent as the difference between total costs of the current system with 
hydropower and a hypothetical optimal all-thermal power generation system using a 
simplified electricity expansion planning model (Shrestha and Abeygunawardana, 2009). 
Thus, the two first Canadian studies have calculated the rent, using the difference between the 
production costs of hydropower plants on a given output and the costs of fossil fuel based 
power plants for the same output, in order to substitute all the hydropower production. Both 
studies had to make assumptions on the unit costs of electricity generation given that 
hydropower was unavailable. The reference electricity prices were estimated using the most 
effective combination of technologies available at the time of the studies to satisfy the 
observed load curve, given that hydropower was unavailable. In Gillen and Wen (2000) the 
financial data of Ontario Hydro were used in order to estimate the potential tax revenues 
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based on the economic rent of the plants and to assess the impact of such a rent taxation. This 
second approach uses the electricity price as agreed in long-term import/ export contracts. The 
results of the rent calculation are shown in Table 1. 
Given that the long-run marginal cost of electricity generation from sources other than the 
existing plant is rather uncertain, Amundsen and Tjøtta (1993) considered scenarios of back-
stop prices to estimate the long-run rent of hydropower generation in Norway. In this analysis 
the rent of seven producer regions was measured considering the precipitation variability 
between Norwegian sites. The authors differentiate between the short-run and the long-run 
rent. Because of the uncertainties in regard to long-term electricity price forecasts, two 
scenarios have been calculated: one high backstop price scenario and a low-price scenario. 
Under such conditions, important rents arise for the Norwegian electricity sector (Table 1). 
In comparison to the studies presented above, Banfi et al. (2005) calculate the production 
costs of the hydropower plants more precisely, because of the detailed data set on the firm 
level that they had at their disposal. Similar to these studies, the objective of that paper was to 
carry out an estimation of the total hydropower rent potentially generated in Switzerland by 
assuming a competitive European and Swiss electricity market. To achieve this goal, the 
authors calculated the hydropower rent for four different categories of hydropower producers: 
(i) run-of- river plants of head below 25 m; (ii) run-of-river plants of head above 25 m; (iii) 
storage plants with pumps and (iv) storage plants without pumps. The paper shows that the 
hypothetical total rent potentially generated by the Swiss hydropower sectors given 
assumptions on prices and production, amounts on average to 650 million €/year. The paper 
also demonstrates that the economic rent varies significantly between the different production 
technologies. The run-of-river plants account for only 28% of the potential total average rent, 
whereas the storage plants generate the remaining 72%. Finally, it can be illustrated that a 
variation in the hypothetical prices, for instance induced by internalization policies, 
determines significant changes in the level of economic rent potentially generated by the 
hydropower sector (Banfi et al., 2005). 
Considering that the hydropower rent is site specific by nature and thus going along with 
Banfi et al. (2005)., Shrestha and Abeygunawardana (2009) argue that it is more appropriate 
to estimate the rent specific to individual hydropower projects rather than the rent of the entire 
hydropower system. Following the argument of Zuker and Jenkins (1984) for an “ideal” 
approach, in their study they calculate the economic rent of a hydropower plant (or project) by 
determining the least-cost power development plans with and without the hydropower plant, 
whose rent is to be calculated. For that purpose, they use a long-term power generation 
planning model. 
Shrestha and Abeygunawardana (2009) applied their methodology to estimate the rent of a 
hydropower project in Nepal in two cases: (i) when the project is developed to supply power 
only to the domestic market of the country and (ii) when the entire hydropower output of the 
project is exported. Their analysis shows that the economic rent of a hydropower project 
would be sensitive to changes in discount rate and load growth in both domestic and export 
markets. The rent is also found to be sensitive to variations in prices of coal and gas in the 
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export market case. A key finding of the study is that the economic rent of a hydropower 
project does not have a monotonic variation with a change in either the system load growth 
rate or hydro energy availability. The study also provides an interesting insight to the policy 
makers engaged in the formulation of a hydropower rent policy that the economic rent of 
hydropower need not increase with an increase in the price of an individual fossil fuel used by 
thermal power plants nor does it need to increase always with fuel price escalation rates. 
In their study applied in the case of Lao PDR, Boungnong and Phonekeo (2012) also 
calculated rent for two types of hydropower projects: domestic demand oriented project and 
large and export oriented project. They also use the concept of hydro rent as a measure of cost 
savings achievable by the use of hydro resources over the least cost alternatives. Their results 
shown in Table 1 suggest that the economic benefit is much lower for predominantly export 
projects than for predominantly domestic consumption projects. However, the authors point 
out that the easiest projects to finance are probably those with high exports and hence low 
regional economic value. 
Presented as the first attempt to estimate the hydroelectricity rent in Italy the study of 
Massarutto and Pontoni (2015) show that hydroelectricity production generates the highest 
rent ever estimated, averaging from 30.3 €/MWh to 82.4 €/MWh. Since operators did not 
release any information on costs, to estimate both investment costs and operation costs the 
authors opted for parametric approaches and then compared their values to those published in 
two surveys conducted by GSE (2010) and IRENA (2012). Concerning the apportionment of 
that important rent, this paper advocate for the adoption of a resource rent tax, as it would 
reduce the trade-off between rent-seizing and environmental protection. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of different estimates of the hydropower rent in €/MWh 
(Adapted from [Massarutto and Pontoni, 2015]) 
 
Author Methodology Countries Results (€/MWh) 
Bernard et al. 
(1982) 
 
Use of the unit cost of 
electricity production 
in the absence of the 
hydropower plants as 
a proxy for electricity 
price  
Canada 6.8 - 16.4  
Zucker and Jenkins 
(1984) 
Same as above but 
optimization by using 




Gilen and Wen 
(2000) 
Same as above but use 
of the financial data of 
Ontario Hydro 
Canada (Ontario) 25.3 
Amundsen and 
Tjøtta (1993) 
Estimation of the 
long-run rent of 






scenarios of back-stop 
prices 
Banfi et al. (2005) 
 
Calculation of the 
hydropower rent for 
run-of- river plants 
and for storage plants 
with and without 
pumps 




Determination of the 
least-cost power 
development plans 
with and without the 
hydropower plant 
Nepal 6.7 - 23.1 
Boungnong and 
Phonekeo (2012) 
Use of the software 
EVALS to derive two 
least-cost generation 
expansion plans: with 
and without the 
nominated hydro 
resource. The 
difference in the costs 
of two plans gives the 
rent of the hydro 
resource. 




construction of a 
dataset on technical 
and concession-related 
variables for all 
hydroelectric plants. 
 
Italy 30.3 - 82.4  
 
In all the above studies, economic rent is determined either in the case of a perfectly 
competitive market or by using the electricity price as agreed in long-term import/export 
contracts or by considering scenarios of back-stop prices. Otherwise, some of the previous 
studies carried out ex post evaluation of rent specific to individual hydropower project since 
detailed data were available. In Cameroon, electricity sector is not deregulated and there are 
no observable competitive electricity prices that could be used to calculate the hydropower 
rent. Furthermore, the data are not easily available but in this present study, while using a 




3. The power sector in Cameroon  
3.1 – Overview of the situation 
According to the International Energy Agency (Figure 2) Cameroon’s total electricity 
production was estimated at 6849 GWh in 2013 and was mostly based on hydropower (71%). 
Per capita electricity consumption (0.28 MWh/capita) was very low in comparison with the 
African average (0.58 MWh/capita) and very far away from the average of the OECD 
countries (8.07 MWh/capita). 
Figure 2: Cameroonian’s electricity generation by fuel from 1971 to 2013 
 
Source: International Energy Agency 2016 (Energy Balance of Cameroon) 
 
In Cameroon, the supply of public electricity service was provided until 2001 by a wholly 
integrated electricity company, Sonel (Société Nationale d’Electricité du Cameroun), a 
monopolistic structure which was responsible for the generation, transmission and distribution 
of electricity throughout the country. The liberalization of the sector is established by the 
1998 electricity law which set a new electricity regulatory framework, where competition 
principles and private involvement could be developed under the supervision of the Electricity 
Sector Regulatory Agency (ARSEL). The Electricity Administration, within the Ministry of 
Water and Energy, defines the country’s electricity policy and writes the concession contracts 
(article 40). This policy is implemented by ARSEL, which also monitors the enforcement of 
the concession contracts, issuing penalties and fees if necessary (article 40, §6 to 11). Tariffs 
are set in the concession contracts and are renegotiated every 5 years (article 50). Rural 
electrification is under the control of another agency, the Rural Electrification Agency (AER). 
On July 18, 2001 the Government of Cameroon and AES Corporation signed a concession 
contract defining the terms, conditions and obligations of AES-Sonel’s operations, the new 
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integrated company. On September 12, 2014 AES Sonel was renamed as Eneo Cameroon 
since the British private equity investment firm, Actis, took over all assets of the American 
company, AES, in Cameroon’s electricity sector
1
. In 2014, Eneo’s generation facilities fleet 
consists of 732 MW of Hydro plants, 301 MW of Thermal Fuel plants and 216 MW of 
Thermal Gas plants. The transmission network includes 1944.29 km of High-Voltage lines, 
15081.48 km of Medium-Voltage lines and 15209.25 km of Low-Voltage lines. The 
distribution network comprises 11450 km lines of 5.5 to 33 KV and 11158 km lines of 220 to 
380 KV (www.eneocameroon.cm visited on June 16, 2016).  
Another important player in the electricity sector in Cameroon is EDC (Electricity 
Development Corporation), a state-owned company, created in November 2006 in order to 
manage public assets and promote investment in the sector. On October 8, 2015 another state-
owned company, la Société Nationale de Transport de l’Electricité (Sonatrel), was created 
with the responsibility of ensuring the electricity transmission and the management of the 
transmission network, on behalf of the State. But its actual implementation is still awaited… 
 
Figure 3: Institutional Players in the Cameroonian Electricity Sector 
















                                                          
1
 Since June 2014, KPDC (Kribi Power Development Company) and DPDC (Dibamba Power Development 
Company) are the ownership of Globeleq, a wholly-owned Actis company.  
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3.2 – Future prospects 
Cameroon is aiming to become an emerging country by 2035 and to overcome this challenge, 
the Government has prepared in 2006 a 2030 Electricity Sector Development Plan (PDSE-
2030). Due to the non achievement of the objectives targeted by the “National Strategy of 
Poverty Reduction”, launched in 2003 and on which was notably based the former study 
PDSE-2030, the authorities formulated, in 2009, first a comprehensive socio-economic 
development vision for the short, medium and long terms, called “Cameroon 2035 Vision”, 
then the “Strategy of Growth and Employment” that focused on the 2010 - 2020 decade, 
while targeting objectives that are globally aligned to those of “Cameroon 2035 Vision”. Both 
strategies targeted the following objectives, among others: (i) the development of the energy 
sector in general and that of the electricity in particular, as a prerequisite notably to the 
implementation of new major and energy-intensive projects, pertaining, in particular, to the 
industrial and mining sectors, and (ii) the stimulation of the Cameroonian exportations, 
particularly those of energy to the countries of the Central African region (STUDI 
International, 2014). 
Cameroon has had a decade of strong economic performance, with GDP growing at an 
average of four percent per year. It reached 5.8% in 2015, compared with 5.9% in 2014 (INS, 
2016). But the lack of energy, mainly electrical energy (and particularly in the rural areas) 
remains the major bottleneck for further economic development. Indeed, many studies have 
confirmed the intuition that an economic policy aimed at improving energy supply will 
necessarily have a positive impact on economic growth. One of our previous study found that 
every percentage increase in oil products consumption increases economic growth by around 
1.1 per cent in Cameroon (Fondja, 2013). 
Electricity demand continued to witness a robust growth of about 7.5% for the public sector. 
This trend is essentially due to production in the industrial sector as well as industries in the 
metallurgy and cement branch and to the increase in the number of connections. Table 2 
shows the estimation made by the Consultancy firm “STUDI International” of the overall 
national demand to be met by the electricity generation. To cope with the growth of electricity 
demand and in order to achieve the goal of positioning the country as a potential supplier of 
energy in the Central African Power Pool (PEAC), Cameroon is envisaging to further develop 
hydropower, not only for its environmental virtues but also because of its wide availability. 
According to the authorities, the country possesses the second greatest hydroelectric potential 
in Africa, with an estimated 20 GW, following the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, 
only less than four percent of this potential is currently realized. Thus, an ex ante calculation 










Table 2: Overall national demand to be met by the electricity generation 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 




































































































 High Scenario – Without RTA Project
2





















Source: STUDI International (2014) 
 
  
                                                          
2
 The two projects relating to ALUCAM factory, previously planned in the locality of EDEA, and having been 
placed on hold by Rio Tinto Alcan (RTA) until an unidentified date. 
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4. Methodology and rent evaluation 
4.1 – Methodology to calculate hydropower rent 
According to Zuker and Jenkins (1984), an ideal approach to estimate the economic rent from 
hydropower production should be based on the difference in cost of the least-cost systems 
both with and without hydro plant. Following this argument, in this study we evaluate the 
hydroelectric rent for the entire hydropower system of the Cameroon as the difference 
between optimized total costs of two hypothetical systems: one with hydropower and the 
other without hydropower (and thus using gas plants as the substitutes since it is the most 
likely alternative). The planning period (when the rent is generated) is 2013-2035 and the two 
scenarios take into account the already installed capacities in 2013. 
The flow chart of the methodology is presented in Figure 4 (Shrestha and Abeygunawardana, 
2009). The total discounted economic rent (TER) of the hydropower system would be the 
savings in total cost of power generation (∆TC) in the presence of low cost hydro resource. 
 
Figure 4: Flowchart of the methodology to calculate hydro rent 
















Original system load 
shape and load 
forecast 
Existing and 
candidate plants data 
(data of gas plants) 
Data of hydropower 
plants whose rent to be 
studied 
Levelized unit hydropower rent = ΔTC/ Discounted total energy generation 
during the planning Period 
Discounted total cost savings = ΔTC ≡ (TC1-TC2) 
Optimal system cost 
with Hydro plant = TC2 
Optimal system cost 
without Hydro plant = TC1 
Optimal system plan 
with Hydro plant 
Optimal system plan 
without Hydro plant 
15 
 
Thus,    TER = ΔTC ≡ (TC1 − TC2) 
The levelized unit economic rent (LER) of the hydropower project can be calculated as  






                                                                                                 (1) 
Where r is the discount rate; Et is the electricity generated in year t (t=0 corresponds to 2013 
and t=21 corresponds to 2035) 







⁄                                                                                                             (2) 
 
4.2 – Input data and assumptions 
The planning horizon of the present study is 22 years (i.e. from 2013 to 2035). Year 2013 is 
considered as the base year for the purpose of calculating the costs of generation expansion 
plans. A discount rate of 10% is considered, which is the rate usually used in the public sector 
projects in Cameroon.  
The software LEAP (Long range Energy Alternatives Planning System) version: 2015.0.19.0 
(developed at the Stockholm Environment Institute) was used to determine the optimized total 
costs of generation expansion plans in order to meet the projected demand. The model is 
discussed in detail in Appendix A. 
 
 
4.2.1 – ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE CAPACITIES AND ELECTRICITY DEMAND 
According to the Table 2, the projected electricity demands in 2035 are 12196 GWh (Low 
scenario), 24413 GWh (Median scenario without Energy management) and 48906 GWh 
(High scenario without Energy management). The corresponding peak capacities are 2001 
MW, 3906 MW and 7649 MW. 
 
 
4.2.1.1 – “High” Scenario 
It is an optimistic scenario which aims to make Cameroon become an emergent country 
beyond 2030 and is translated into an annual economic growth of 6.53% on average over the 
entire duration of the study (STUDI International, 2014). 
This scenario assumes, in accordance with the strategic guidelines of the State of Cameroon, 
the realization of all the major/great planned projects, in particular the industrial and mining 
ones, expected to be highly energy-consuming, even the most ambitious ones and the heaviest 
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to finance, as well as the energy infrastructure projects, without delays in the endorsed due 
dates. In terms of interconnection with neighboring countries, the High scenario is also 
aligned with the strategic ambitions of local authorities for the implementation and 
strengthening of energy exports from Cameroon, by the specific valorization of hydropower 
potential. In this context, all the interconnections
3
 are taken into account and are supposed to 
be materialized according to the announced or estimated achievable horizons. Table 3 shows 
the growth rates of the capacities and the electricity demands from the current situation. 
 
Table 3: Growth rates of the capacities and electricity demand for the High scenario 
 






















Hydro 742 742 (7104) (10.82) 0 
Gas 216 216 (6578) 0 (16.8) 
Oil 321 321 0 0 
Biogas 8 8 0 0 
Total 1287 7649   
 
The charts of Figure 5 show the evolution of the electricity demand under the High scenario 











                                                          
3
 Namely interconnections with Chad (N’Djamena and 17 border communities) from 2015, with Nigeria (Yola 
from 2020), via Nigeria and to the West Africa (from 2031), and with the Central African Republic from 2019. 
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Figure 5: Evolution of the electricity demand for the High scenario with and without 





4.2.1.2 – “Median” Scenario 
This is a more conservative scenario. Its hypotheses are aligned with the risk analysis results 
considering more reservations on the materialization of aimed large-scale projects, 
particularly those of the energy sector and the intensive energy-consumer projects (industrial 
and mining in particular). This resulted in an Average Annual Growth Rate of the national 
real GDP estimated to 6.05% on average over the study period (STUDI International, 2014). 
Specifically, this scenario considers the realization of projects that seem the safest, and whose 
achievement appears as more likely. In terms of interconnections with neighbors, this scenario 
considers the realization of those appearing as the most pressing, namely the interconnection 
with N’Djamena in Chad and Yola in Nigeria. Table 4 shows the growth rates of the 







Table 4: Growth rates of the capacities and electricity demand for the Median scenario 
 





















Hydro 742 742 (3361) (7.11) 0 
Gas 216 216 (2835) 0 (12.43) 
Oil 321 321 0 0 
Biogas 8 8 0 0 
Total 1287 3906   
 
The charts of Figure 6 show the evolution of the electricity demand under the Median 
scenario with and without additional hydro plants. 
 
Figure 6: Evolution of the electricity demand for the Median scenario with and without 









4.2.1.3 – “Low” Scenario 
This is the most pessimistic scenario, assuming in the future less stimulation of the 
Cameroonian economy and the business climate in the country, which should result in the 
non-realization of all the future major projects announced. This scenario is based on the 
underlying assumptions, admitting a continuation of the growth rate of the national real GDP, 
with a slow and weak trend of improvement that will fade in the long run. The Average 
Annual Growth Rate of the GDP is thus estimated at 3.81% per annum on average throughout 
the duration of the study (STUDI International, 2014). Per capita income is expected to grow 
gradually, but in a more close way to the recent recorded data. 
This scenario also assumes that none of the interconnections, subject of conventions or 
regional projects’ ideas, can be realized and that Cameroon will look exclusively to meet the 
local power demand, throughout the study period. Table 5 shows the growth rates of the 
capacities and the electricity demands from the current situation. 
 
 
Table 5: Growth rates of the capacities and electricity demand for the Low scenario 
 






















Hydro 742 742 (1456) (3.14) 0 
Gas 216 216 (930) 0 (6.9) 
Oil 321 321 0 0 
Biogas 8 8 0 0 
Total 1287 2001   
 
The charts of Figure 7 show the evolution of the electricity demand under the Low scenario 














Figure 7: Evolution of the electricity demand for the Low scenario with and without 






4.2.2 – DATA USED IN THE ANALYSIS 
 
The fuel costs, the capital costs and the fixed and variable operating and maintenance costs of 
the various electric generation power plants used in this study are given in the table 6. 
 

























 12.2 6.1 117 
Oil plant 1041
c
 12.2 6.1 742.65
f
 
Biogas plant 575 12.2 6.1 117 
a
 According to STUDI International (2014) for a hydropower plant below 200 MW  
b
 According to NREL (2012) for a Gas Turbine Power Plant of 211 MW 
c
 According to ESMAP (2009) for a 300 MW Oil-Fired Power Plant 
d




 corresponds to the water license fee 
f
 corresponds to the weighted average costs of Light Fuel Oil (LFO) and Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) 
                                                          
4
 The National Refinery Company 
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5. Results and sensitivity analyses  
5.1 – Results 
In this study we use the software LEAP as a cost-benefit calculator to determine the optimized 
total costs of generation expansion plans in order to meet the projected demand. The model is 
discussed in detail in Appendix A. The fuel costs, the capital costs and the fixed and variable 
operating and maintenance costs of the different power plants given in the table 6 are 
specifying into LEAP. The salvage values (or decommissioning costs) for decommissioning 
processes and the environmental externality values (i.e. pollution damage or abatement costs) 
are not taken into account since data are not available. 
In this research the hydropower rent is calculated for the whole country as the difference 
between optimized total costs of two hypothetical systems: one with hydropower and the 
other without hydropower. The savings in total cost with hydro plants ∆TC is the difference 
between optimized total costs (the sum of all discounted costs and benefits across all years of 
the study or the Net Present Value) of the scenario with hydropower and the scenario without 
hydropower. 
 
5.1.1 – “HIGH” SCENARIO 
 
In this high scenario, existing Oil and Biogas power plants are expected to be unchanged. In 
the case With Hydro, Gas power plants also remain unchanged and only Hydro power plants 
increase at an annual rate of 10.82 % to reach 7104 MW in 2035. In the case Without Hydro, 
Hydro power plants also remain unchanged and only Gas power plants grow at an annual rate 
of 16.8 % to reach 6578 MW in 2035. 
Under the above assumptions, the Savings in total cost with hydro plants for the High 
scenario is ∆TC = 1846.1 M€ (Table B2 in Appendix B shows a screenshot of LEAP 
calculation). The scenario with hydropower is cheaper than the scenario without hydropower, 
and even than the scenario of Business as usual (Reference scenario). Indeed, if capital costs 
are higher for hydropower plants, the operating and fuel costs are lower and make this 
technology economically better than oil and gas plants. 
Energy production in 2013 is E0 = 6849 GWh and 𝐸𝑡 = 𝐸0 ∗ (1 + 9.35%)
𝑡 with t = 1, 3,... 21 















⁄         
Thus,  LER = 1846.1 6849 ∗ 20.687⁄ = 13.030   




5.1.2 – “MEDIAN” SCENARIO 
 
In this median scenario, existing Oil and Biogas power plants are expected to be unchanged. 
In the case With Hydro, Gas power plants also remain unchanged and only Hydro power 
plants increase at an annual rate of 7.11 % to reach 3361 MW in 2035. In the case Without 
Hydro, Hydro power plants also remain unchanged and only Gas power plants grow at an 
annual rate of 12.43 % to reach 2835 MW in 2035. 
Under the above assumptions, the Savings in total cost with hydro plants for the Median 
scenario is ∆TC = 1770.3 M€ (Table B4 in Appendix B shows a screenshot of LEAP 
calculation). Here again, the scenario with hydropower is cheaper than the scenario without 
hydropower, and even than the scenario of Business as usual (Reference scenario). Indeed, if 
capital costs are higher for hydropower plants, the operating and fuel costs are lower and 
make this technology economically more attractive than oil and gas plants. 
Energy production in 2013 is E0 = 6849 GWh and 𝐸𝑡 = 𝐸0 ∗ (1 + 5.95%)
𝑡 with t = 1, 3,... 21 















⁄         
Thus,  LER = 1770.3 6849 ∗ 15.261⁄ = 16.937   
Therefore, the economic rent for the median scenario is 𝟏𝟔. 𝟗𝟑𝟕 €/𝐌𝐖𝐡   
 
5.1.3 – “LOW” SCENARIO 
 
In this low scenario, existing Oil and Biogas power plants are expected to be unchanged. In 
the case With Hydro, Gas power plants also remain unchanged and only Hydro power plants 
increase at an annual rate of 3.14 % to reach 1456 MW in 2035. In the case Without Hydro, 
Hydro power plants also remain unchanged and only Gas power plants grow at an annual rate 
of 6.9 % to reach 930 MW in 2035. 
Under the above assumptions, the Savings in total cost with hydro plants for the Median 
scenario is ∆TC = 1227.3 M€ (Table B6 in Appendix B shows a screenshot of LEAP 
calculation). Once again, the scenario with hydropower is cheaper than the scenario without 
hydropower, and even than the scenario of Business as usual (Reference scenario). Indeed, if 
capital costs are higher for hydropower plants, the operating and fuel costs are lower and 
make this technology economically more cost-effective than oil and gas plants. 
Energy production in 2013 is E0 = 6849 GWh and 𝐸𝑡 = 𝐸0 ∗ (1 + 2.66%)
𝑡 with t = 1, 3,... 21 
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⁄         
Thus,  LER = 1227.3 6849 ∗ 11.706⁄ = 15.308   
Therefore, the economic rent for the low scenario is 𝟏𝟓. 𝟑𝟎𝟖 €/𝐌𝐖𝐡  . According to our 
definition of the economic rent this result imply that producing 1 MWh of electricity from 
Hydropower plants rather than Gas power plants gives rise to a significant surplus of 15.308 
euros to owners. 
 
5.2 – Sensitivity analyses 
5.2.1 – SENSITIVITY OF HYDROPOWER RENT TO VARIATION IN DISCOUNT RATE 
The following table 7 presents the changes in hydropower rent when the discount rate is 
decreased from 10% to 8% and when it is increased to 12%. 
Table 7: Sensitivity of hydropower rent to variation in discount rate 
 
Hydropower rent (in 




8% 16.247 17.185 12.665 
10% (Base case) 15.308 16.937 13.030 
12% 14.406 16.642 13.326 
 
The findings of the previous analysis show that the economic rent of a hydropower project 
would be sensitive to changes in discount rate. For a range of discount rate varying from 8% 
to 12%, changes in the rent are relatively small and not necessarily in the same direction. 
Thus, an increase in the discount rate leads to a decrease in hydro rent for Low and Small 
Scenarios, while it results in an increase in rent for the High Scenario. One explication is that 
in the high scenario where capacities are growing very fast, with high discount rate the 






5.2.2 – SENSITIVITY OF HYDROPOWER RENT TO VARIATION IN CAPACITY COSTS 
The following table 8 shows the effects of variation in capacity costs when the discount rate is 
10%. 
 
Table 8: Sensitivity of hydropower rent to variation in capacity costs 
 
Hydropower rent (in 
Euro/MWh) Low Scenario Median Scenario High Scenario 
Capital costs 
(Percentage of 
increase, with 10% in 
discount rate) 
-1% 15.697 17.93 14.664 
+ 1% 14.876 15.83 11.192 
+ 3% 13.877 13.215 6.794 
The results of table 8 confirm that the rent of a hydropower project depends on a number of 
parameters of the electricity industry, and first of all on capacities costs. The rent definitely 
decreases with an increase in capacity costs. 
 
5.2.3 – SENSITIVITY OF HYDROPOWER RENT TO VARIATION IN FUEL COSTS OF OIL AND GAS 
The following table 9 presents the changes in hydropower rent in case of the variation of fuel 
costs and when the discount rate is 10%. 
 
Table 9: Sensitivity of hydropower rent to variation in fuel costs of oil and gas 
 
Hydropower rent (in 
Euro/MWh) Low Scenario Median Scenario High Scenario 
Fuel costs of oil and 
gas (Percentage of 
increase, with 10% in 
discount rate) 
-1% 13.159 13.986 11.26 
+ 1% 17.756 20.307 15.096 
+ 3% 23.737 28.575 20.329 
According to these results, and as might be expected, the hydropower rent change 
monotonically with change in prices of oil and gas.  
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6. Conclusions and possible policy implications of this study 
The aim of this paper is to estimate the economic rent generated in the Cameroonian 
hydropower sector. To this end, the methodology used is to calculate the rent as the difference 
between optimized total costs of two hypothetical systems: one with hydropower and the 
other without hydropower. Of course, our results depend on important assumptions with 
regard to CAPEX, OPEX and electricity demand since the rent of a hydropower project 
depends on a number of parameters of the electricity industry. For the most likely Median 
scenario concerning the future demand trends, our calculation gives a value of 16.937 
Euro/MWh of hydropower rent.  
 
According to our definition of the economic rent this result imply that producing 1 MWh of 
electricity from Hydropower plants rather than Gas power plants gives rise to a significant 
surplus of 16.937 euros to owners. This rent is in the range of values found by Amundsen and 
Tjøtta (1993), Banfi et al. (2005) and Shrestha and Abeygunawardana (2009) for Norway, 
Switzerland and Nepal respectively (Cf. Table 1). This value does not include well-known 
negative externalities of thermal power plants and other benefits of the construction of 
hydropower plants such as irrigation water and flood control. Hence, it is enough to 
encourage Government, private companies and investors to develop the hydropower sector. 
 
Notwithstanding the methodologies used for its estimation, it is possible to say that 
hydropower generates a noteworthy rent. The ex ante calculation of hydropower rent is of 
interest to policy makers in countries like Cameroon, which have large number of projects yet 
to be developed. But, it should be noted that the estimations of the potential hydropower rent 
illustrated in this study are based on important assumptions. Therefore, our results should be 
considered as a first approximation and used with caution, since they do not reflect actual 
values realized or faced in the hydropower sector today. Future lines of research should go 
towards a more precise estimation of the hydro rent in Cameroon, by using hourly production 
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8.1 – Appendix A: The generation expansion planning model 
In this study the hydropower rent is calculated for the whole country as the difference 
between optimized total costs of two hypothetical systems: one with hydropower and the 
other without hydropower. The software LEAP was used to determine the optimized total 
costs of generation expansion plans in order to meet the projected demand. 
In calculating the optimal system LEAP takes into account all of the relevant costs and 
benefits incurred in the system including: 
 The capital costs for building new processes. 
 The salvage values for decommissioning processes 
 The fixed and variable operating and maintenance costs 
 The fuel costs 
 The environmental externality values. 
The output of the model will describe the desired types of generating plants to be added, their 
capacity, the years when the new capacities should be added during the planning period, and 
the levels of electricity generation by each of the new and existing generating plants during 
each year in the planning period in order to meet the projected future electricity demand at the 
minimum cost. 
 
The objective function is to, for each year (y) and technology (t) minimize the costs of the 
system. Algebraically, the objective function can be expressed as  
Minimize  
 





(1) 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑦,𝑡  is the discounted total operating costs per year for each 
technology and is calculated as : 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑦,𝑡
= (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑦,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑦,𝑡
+ ∑(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑦,𝑙,𝑡 ∗ VariableCost𝑦,𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑙)
l
) ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦,𝑡 
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𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑦,𝑡 : This variable gives the total capacity available by technology for each year 
𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑦,𝑡 : The fixed cost, also a function of technology as well as the model year, is the 
cost per unit of capital stock (or installed capacity) of a particular technology. 
VariableCost𝑦,𝑡 : The variable cost is defined for each technology in each year and is the cost 
per unit of activity of that technology 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑦,𝑙,𝑡 : This variable represents the “activity” of the technology. Its unit is in terms of 
power – of energy out per year. Where the energy out, is related by an output to activity ratio. 
(Conversely the energy used is related to the activity by an input to activity ratio). Activity is 
calculated for each technology, for each year and for each time slice (l). 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑙 : The fraction of the year accounted for in each load region 
 
(2) 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑦,𝑡  is the annual discounted capital investment for each 
technology and is calculated as : 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑦,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑦,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑦,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦,𝑡 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑦,𝑡 : The capital cost of each technology is given as a function of the technology 
as well as the year in which the technology was invested. 
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑦,𝑡 : This is new investment in capacity by the model year in which the investment 
was made, for each technology. 
 
(3) 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑦,𝑡 is the value of each technology remaining at the end of the modeling 
period and its expression is : 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑦,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑦,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑦,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦,𝑡 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦,𝑡 : This is the (discounted) salvage value of a technology at the end of the 
modeling period, represented as a fraction of the initial per unit capital cost. It is determined 
for each model year as well as each technology. It is calculated by estimating the depreciated 
value of the technology at end of the modeling period. 
 
The constraints are: 
(1) Fuel Production Constraints: Fuel production during each time slice (l) and year (y) must 
be greater than or equal to its use (consumption) by technologies plus any exogenous 
demand for that fuel (f). That is : 










= ∑(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑦,𝑙,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑣𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑦,𝑡,𝑓 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑙
t
 
𝑂𝑡𝑝𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑣𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑦,𝑡,𝑓 : The output activity ratio, gives the output of fuel as a ratio to the 
activity of the technology. It is defined by year (as the technology could degrade), by 
technology, by time slice and for the fuel which is produced. 
𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑣𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑦,𝑡,𝑓 : The input activity ratio, gives the input (use) of fuel as a ratio to the 
activity of the technology. It is defined by year (as the technology could degrade), by 
technology, by time slice and for the fuel which is used. 
 
(2) Capacity constraints: The capacity of each technology must be greater than its activity for 
each load region. That is  
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑦,𝑙,𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑦,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦,𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥𝐿𝑅𝑙 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦,𝑡 : This is defined for each year (y) and each technology (t). It is used to 
convert annual capacity to available capacity for each time slice (l). 
 
(3) Activity constraints: The activity of each technology is limited by its annual availability. 
That is  
∑(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑦,𝑙,𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑙)
l
≤ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑦,𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦,𝑡  
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦,𝑡  : This is defined for each year and each technology. It is used to 






8.2 – Appendix B: Screenshots of LE AP calculations 





Table B2: Screenshot of the result of LEAP calculation for the High scenario –  










Table B4: Screenshot of the result of LEAP calculation for the Median scenario –  











Table B6: Screenshot of the result of LEAP calculation for the Low scenario –  







Amundsen E.S., Andersen C., Sannarnes J.G. (1992), "Rent Taxes on Norwegian 
Hydropower Generation", The Energy Journal, 13:1, pp. 97-116. 
 
Amundsen E.S., Tjøtta S. (1993), “Hydroelectric rent and precipitation variability: the case of 
Norway”, Energy Economics 15 (2) 81–91 
 
Banfi S., Filippini M., Mueller A. (2005), “An estimation of the Swiss hydropower rent”,  
Energy Policy, 33, 927–937. 
 
Bernard J.-T., Bridges G., Scott A. (1982), “An Evaluation of Potential Canadian 
Hydroelectric Rents”, Resources Paper No. 78, Program in Natural Resource Economics, 
University of British Columbia, Vancouver. 
 
Bhattacharyya S. (2011), Energy economics: concepts, issues, markets and governance, 
London: Springer, 2011. 
 
Boungnong C., Phonekeo D. (2012), “Economic Rent from Hydropower Development in the 
Case of Lao PDR”, GMSARN International Journal 6 (2012) 35-44 
 
Edwards B.K. (2003), The Economics of Hydroelectricity Power, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
 
ESMAP (2009), Study of Equipment Prices in the Power Sector, Energy Sector Management 
Program (ESMAP), ESMAP Technical Paper 122/09 
 
Fondja W.Y.D. (2012), Energie, économie et environnement : contradiction ou co-
développement ? Le cas du Cameroun, L’Harmattan, 2012. 
 
Fondja W.Y.D. (2013), “Energy consumption and economic growth: Evidence from 
Cameroon”, Energy Policy, 61 (2013), pp. 1295–1304 
 
Gillen D., Wen, J.-F. (2000), “Taxing hydroelectricity in Ontario”, Canadian Public Policy 26 
(1), 35–49. 
 
GSE (2010),  Produzione di energia da fonti rinnovabili, Costi di produzione e analisi degli 
investimenti, Unità Studi, Rome. 
 
Hartwick J.M., Olewiler N.D. (1998), The Economics of Natural Resource Use (Second 
Edition), Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.  
 
INS (2016), Les Comptes Nationaux Trimestriels, 4
ème
 trimestre 2015, avril 2016. 
 





Massarutto A., Pontoni F. (2015), “Rent seizing and environmental concerns: A parametric 
valuation of the Italian hydropower sector”, Energy Policy 78 (2015) 31-40 
 
NREL (2012), Cost and performance data for power generation technologies, Prepared for the 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), February 2012 
 
Pineau P.-O. (2004), “Transparency in the Dark – An Assessment of the Cameroonian 
Electric Sector Reform”, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, Canada, 
August 12, 2004. 
 
Rothman M. (2000), “Measuring and apportioning rents from hydroelectric power 
developments”, World Bank Discussion Paper 419, July 2000 
 
Shrestha R.M., Abeygunawardana A.M.A.K. (2009), “Evaluation of economic rent of 
hydropower projects”, Energy Policy 37 (2009) 1886-1897 
 
STUDI International (2014), Mise à Jour du Plan de Développement du Secteur de 
l’Electricité (PDSE) à l’Horizon 2030, Projet de Rapport Final, Volume 1 - Présentation, 
Synthèse et Conclusions, Décembre 2014 
 
Zucker R.C., Jenkins G.P. (1984), Blue Gold: Hydroelectric Rent in Canada, Economic 
Council of Canada, Ottawa.  
 
 
